Primer on United States Trade Remedies by Sandler, Michael
MICHAEL SANDLER*
Primer on United States Trade Remedies
I. Introduction ............................................ 762
II. Remedies Against "Unfair" Imports ...................... 763
A. Antidumping Duties (Unfair Pricing) .................. 763
1. Price Comparisons ............................... 763
2. Foreign Value Rules ............................. 764
3. Communist Imports .............................. 766
4. Adjustments: High-Tech Products .................. 767
5. The Injury Decision .............................. 768
B. Countervailing Duties (Subsidies) ..................... 769
1. Types of Subsidies ............................... 769
2. Treatment of Domestic Subsidies .................. 770
3. Communist Imports .............................. 771
4. Upstream Subsidies .............................. 772
C. Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Procedures ...... 772
D. Section 337 (Infringement, Unfair Practices) ........... 774
1. Procedures ...................................... 775
2. U se of Section 337 ............................... 775
3. The Injury Standard .............................. 776
4. Other Procedural Aspects ......................... 777
5. High-Tech Products .............................. 777
6. Gray M arket Goods .............................. 778
E. Custom s Fraud ..................................... 778
*Partner, Foster Pepper & Riviera, Seattle, Washington.
762 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
III. Remedies to Adjust Trade Flows ............. 779
A. Section 301 (Retaliation to Protect U.S. Trade) ........ 779
1. International Procedure ........................... 779
2. U .S. Procedure .................................. 780
3. The 1984 Law ................................... 781
4. Recent Use of Section 301 ........................ 782
B. Section 201 (Temporary Import Relief:
The "Escape Clause") ............................... 782
1. Factors Affecting ITC Decisions ................... 783
2. Factors Affecting Presidential Decisions ............ 783
C. Section 406 (Market Disruption
by Communist Imports) ............................. 785
D. National Security Remedy ........................... 786
E. Investment Tax Credit .............................. 786
F. Balance of Payments Surcharge ...................... 786
IV. Political and Product Specific Remedies .................... 787
A. Agriculture, Textiles, Ad Hoc Legislation ............. 787
B. Remedies Rooted in Foreign Policy ................... 788
C. Bilateral Remedies: Japan ........................... 789
D. Voluntary Restraint Arrangements .................... 790
V . C onclusion ............................................. 791
I. Introduction
United States remedies to trade problems such as dumping, infringement,
the flooding of United States markets by foreign goods, and the closing of
foreign markets to United States goods. These involve complex laws and
procedures, as well as the ebb and flow of international and domestic
political forces. This article divides these remedies into three broad catego-
ries: (i) remedies that are directed at unfairly traded imports into the United
States; (ii) laws that attempt to adjust trade flows between the United States
and other countries, whether or not fairly traded; and (iii) political and
product specific remedies that, for the most part, fall outside normal inter-
national trading rules. While there is an attempt here to identify current
issues and analyze practice in each area, an overview such as this necessarily
omits some basic points as well as subtleties. It also omits related topics such
as United States export controls and customs law.
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II. Remedies Against "Unfair" Imports
Trade officials in the Reagan administration have spoken often about a
central goal of U.S. trade policy: the achievement of a "level playing field."
This translates as a policy against artificial or unfair stimulants to foreign
imports to the United States, as well as a policy against artificial or excessive
barriers to U.S. exports abroad. Looking first at imports into this country,
the United States has long afforded legal remedies against unfair trading
practices that benefit imports. The key remedies have been the antidumping
laws, the countervailing duty laws, the so-called "section 337" remedy
against other unfair practices (particularly infringement of intellectual prop-
erty rights), and, to a lesser extent, U.S. customs fraud penalties.
A. ANTIDUMPING DUTIES (UNFAIR PRICING)
The antidumping laws impose penalty duties on certain unfairly priced
imports. The concept of "dumping" depends on comparing prices in two
markets: prices in the U.S. market and in a foreign domestic market.
Specifically, the law asks if the U.S. market price of the import is below
the price charged by the foreign producer in his "home market." The idea is
that a foreign producer ought not focus-or dump-his excess production
abroad by offering a lower price on his exports than on his domestic sales.
Antidumping remedies are authorized internationally under Article VI of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and by the separately
adopted GATT Antidumping Code.1 Under U.S. law,2 the Commerce
Department decides whether there has been dumping, and how much
dumping has occurred. A second determination in an antidumping case is
whether dumped imports have caused some "material injury," or threat of
material injury, to the U.S. industry competing with the imports. The
International Trade Commission (or ITC) makes this injury determination.
Only if both determinations are affirmative will antidumping duties be
imposed.
1. Price Comparisons
In an antidumping proceeding, the Commerce Department undertakes
the required price comparisons. It normally does this by comparing each
price into the U.S. market from a foreign producer (or exporter) with an
1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, A1365, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The full name of the current GATT Antidumping Code is the
Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(Relating to Antidumping Measures), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 96-153, Part I, 96th Cong.
1st Sess. 309 (1979).
2. The relevant U.S. statute and regulations are at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673 (West Supp. 1985), et
seq., and 19 C.F.R. Part 353 (1984).
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average of the foreign producer's home market prices. To have a common
basis for comparison, Commerce works all prices back to the factory door
and converts the home market prices to U.S. dollars. 3
An example will illustrate. Suppose that a Japanese manufacturer exports
cloth to the United States. To measure dumping, we need a benchmark.
That will usually come from sales in the Japanese home market. Assume
that, over a six month period, the average home market price in Japan is Y
3,000 per yard of cloth. (The Commerce Department usually looks at a six
month weighted average price.) 4 We must, however, work this Y 3,000 price
back to the factory door. We do this by subtracting out inland freight in
Japan, commissions, insurance and the like. Let's assume that the resulting
ex-factory price is Y 2,500. Using an exchange rate of 250:1, this would
translate to $10 per yard. Ten dollars would be our benchmark for measur-
ing dumping in this example.
Next, one looks at each U.S. market price for each sale of exported
Japanese cloth in the same period. Assume that the price for one such sale is
$14 per yard. To work this price back to the factory door, we subtract out
ocean freight, insurance, duties, brokerage, inland freight. We then com-
pare the result with our $10 benchmark. If the price to the U.S. market
(worked back to the factory door) is $10 or $12 per yard, there is no
dumping. But if that U.S. price is only $9, there is a full dollar of dumping
against our $10 benchmark. The Commerce Department would divide the
$1 of dumping by the $9 U.S. price, to arrive at an 11 percent dumping
margin-and ultimately an 11 percent antidumping duty.5 In this sense, an
antidumping duty is intended to offset the amount by which a product is
dumped.
Exchange rates are crucial in any comparison: The strong dollar makes it
easier for imports to sell at low prices without dumping (if home market
prices are competitive). In our example, if the dollar was stronger and if the
exchange rate with the yen was 280:1, then our home market price of Y
2,500 would convert to about $8.90. A $9 per yard price to the U.S. market
would no longer be dumped.
2. Foreign Value Rules
The foreign benchmark for measuring dumping is known as the "foreign
value." As noted, foreign value is usually determined from the average
home market prices of each foreign producer. There are some special rules.
First, an individual home market price will not be counted in the average if,
3. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677a(d) (1982), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(a)(1) (West Supp. 1985); 19
C.F.R. § 353.3, § 353.9(d) (1984).
4. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.20 (1984). The six month period of investigation usually includes 150
days prior to the filing of the petition and the first 30 days thereafter. 19 C.F. R. § 353.38 (1984).
5. See 19 C.F.R. § 353.39(a)(2) (1984).
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when worked back to the factory door, that price is below the producer's full
costs of production. Such prices that are below cost are disregarded. 6
Second, at least 10 percent of all home market sales must be above cost for
the Commerce Department even to use home market prices as the dumping
benchmark. (This is known as the 10 percent rule.) Also, the Commerce
Department will only use home market sales as "foreign value" if, when
compared to all sales by the foreign producer to third countries, the home
market sales are at least 5 percent of the third country sales. (This is known
as the 5 percent rule.) 7
If there are no home market sales by the foreign producer, or if those sales
are minimal (less than 5 percent of sales to third countries), or if less than 10
percent of home market sales are above cost, then the Commerce Depart-
ment will not use home market prices. It will consider two fallbacks: prices
to third countries or "constructed value." Third country prices work the
same as home market prices. One takes those prices and works them back
to the factory door (in Japan in our example). "Constructed value" is a
computation of the fully allocated costs of production of the foreign pro-
ducer, including full overhead and a profit element. If constructed value is
used, the dumping margins are usually very high-because the law requires
that an imputed 8 percent profit element be added to the full costs.
8
To summarize, the "dumping margin" on each import sale is the percent-
age by which the average foreign, home market price (or third country price
or constructed value) exceeds the price to the U.S. market-on an ex-
factory basis. There is another step: averaging the dumping margins on all
import sales. Here there is also a special rule. Sales to the U.S. market above
"foreign value" are treated simply as having a 0 percent dumping margin;
they do not offset sales that are dumped. For example, assume there is a sale
to the U.S. market of 100 units with a 25 percent dumping margin (foreign
value = $10; U.S. market price = $8). Assume further that the only other
import sale is of 400 units at $12, or $2 above foreign value. The second sale
would not offset the first. It would be treated as a 0 percent dumping margin.





6. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(b) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 353.7 (1984).
7. The 5 percent rule is a guideline that appears at 19 C.F.R. § 353.4(a) (1984). The 10
percent rule is an internal standard based obliquely on 19 C.F.R. § 353.7(b) (1984).
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(e) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 353.6 (1984). In addition to an 8 percent profit,
General, Selling and Administrative expenses (GSA) that do not equal 10 percent of manu-
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3. Communist Imports
A major controversy in antidumping law is how to treat imports from
communist nations. To compute dumping, one cannot simply look at home
market prices in a controlled economy; prices and costs in communist
countries are largely artificial.
The statute today requires the Commerce Department to identify "surro-
gate" producers in Western countries and to compare prices of communist
imports with the prices charged by these surrogate Western producers. 9 This
leads to erratic results, depending upon which surrogate producer is chosen.
For example, consider a sale of cloth from the People's Republic of China.
Assume that the PRC cloth sells in the United States at $14 per yard, which
would work back to $9 per yard at the factory door. The problem is what do
you compare it with. The law says that one cannot use the home market
price in the PRC because it is artificial. One ust ;nstead find a "surrogate
producer" in a country with a market economy, whiT h also has a comparable
level of economic development to that of the PRC.10 If the price in the
surrogate producer's home market happens to be $9 per yard at the factory
door, there is no dumping. But if that surrogate price turns out to be $10 or
$15 per yard, the PRC cloth will be hit with major antidumping duties.
To show how arbitrary the system is, consider a recent decision involving
potassium fertilizers from the Soviet Union. Since the USSR has a non-
market economy, the Commerce Department was required to select a
surrogate producer of potassium fertilizers whose prices would serve as the
dumping benchmark. In its preliminary decision, the Commerce Depart-
ment selected a West German producer. (The Department makes both a
preliminary and final determination.) The West German company was a
high priced producer; it allegedly had a protected home market; it produced
a somewhat different fertilizer grade than that exported from the Soviet
Union; and the only information available was from the producer's price
list. The result was a high preliminary dumping margin-an astronomical
187 percent. 1 The final dumping determination, however, was diametri-
cally opposite. Instead of selecting the West German company as the
surrogate producer, the Commerce Department chose a Canadian company
instead. This producer was efficient, low cost and low priced. Instead of a
187 percent dumping margin, the final margin was only 1.7 percent. 2
facturing costs will be imputed as 10 percent of those costs. Id. As between third country prices
and "constructed value," the former is the preferred benchmark under the law. 19 C.F.R.
§ 353.4(b) (1984).
9. 19 U.S.C. § 1677b(c) (1982).
10. 19 C.F.R. § 353.8 (1984).
11. Potassium Chloride from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 49 Fed. Reg. 35849
(1984).
12. Potassium Chloride from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 50 Fed. Reg. 4562
(1985). No antidumping duty was imposed, because the ITC found "no material injury" had
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Such a deviation on a commodity item like fertilizer raises questions about
the realism behind the surrogate producer concept. Often, the Commerce
Department will simply use the data from any surrogate producer that is
willing to provide information (provided the producer is from a country
economically comparable to the communist country). Many potential surro-
gates are unwilling to become involved and refuse to cooperate, and there is
no way to compel their cooperation. Those that do cooperate by supplying
price data may have some ulterior motive. Certainly, the vagaries of the
current law make antidumping duties a haphazard threat to all trade with the
PRC and the Eastern Bloc. 13
4. Adjustments: High-Tech Products
Cases involving electronics, machinery and high-tech products present
another type of price comparison problem. Often, these products are pro-
duced to different specifications for the home market than for the United
States. The Commerce Department has to deal with three questions: (1) Is
the foreign market model sufficiently similar to the U.S. market product to
be used in a price comparison? (2) How many of the foreign market models
should be compared with a particular U.S. model? (3) How does one adjust
for physical differences between the foreign and U.S. models? On the last
question, the law permits an "adjustment" based on differences in produc-
tion costs. 14 On the first two questions, there are statutory guides but no
hard and fast rules. 15 These decisions require detailed understanding of the
product, which turns on technical knowledge acquired by Commerce De-
partment analysts during the case. The ability to persuade the Commerce
Department to accept appropriate technical parameters early in the case can
be critical to these determinations. 16
been caused by the Soviet imports. Potassium Chloride from the U.S.S.R., USITC Pub. No.
1656 (March 1985).
13. Congress this session may consider an alternative proposed by Senator Heinz. It would
base "unfair pricing" calculations for communist imports on a weighted average F.O.B. price
for imports to the U.S. from all countries. The data would come from U.S. Customs statistics.
Countries previously found guilty of dumping or subsidies would be excluded from the data. In
essence, communist imports could not be priced below the average price of other imports-
without risking penalty duties. See Horlick & Shuman, Nonmarket Economy Trade and U.S.
Antidumping/Countervailing Duty Laws, 18 INT'L LAW. 807, 832 (1984).
14. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677b(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1985); 19 C.F.R. § 353.16 (1984).
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(16) (1982).
16. Three other adjustments are recognized: (1) Where a discount is normally granted for
sales in large quantities, an adjustment may be granted where larger quantities per sale are sold
in one market than in the other (e.g., 1,000 unit sales in the U.S. versus 10 unit sales in the home
market). 19 C.F.R. § 353.14 (1984). (2) There is also an adjustment for level of trade differences
(e.g., home market sales are to retailers, while U.S. sales are to trading companies or
distributors-where one would expect the price to be lower). 19 C.F.R. § 353.19 (1984). (3)
There is an adjustment for general circumstances of sale differences (differences in the two
markets between interest rates, commissions, advertising costs, post-sale warehousing ex-
penses). 19 C.F.R. § 353.15 (1984).
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5. The Injury Decision
The International Trade Commission (ITC) makes all "injury" decisions
in antidumping cases. A preliminary decision will be made in the first
forty-five days of a case, to determine whether the case should be dismissed
at the outset because there is no minimal evidence (or "reasonable indica-
tion") of injury to U.S. producers.' 7 After the Commerce Department
makes its final dumping determinations, the ITC completes a more detailed
injury investigation. 18 The ITC decision usually addresses four basic ques-
tions: (1) which U.S. firms constitute the "industry";' 9 (2) have those firms
as a group suffered injury (such as lost profits, lay-offs, plant closures, but
not mere loss of market share to imports); (3) are those U.S. firms "threat-
ened" with injury; and (4) have the dumped imports in fact been a "contrib-
uting cause" of this actual or threatened injury?20 The key factors on
"causation" are undercutting of U.S. producer prices, resulting lost sales by
U.S. producers, and increasing import volumes and market shares of the
target imports. 21 Indeed, significant import market shares combined with
substantial price undercutting are central to an injury case.
Simultaneous cases against imports from two or more countries bring into
play the doctrine of "cumulation." Specifically, the ITC may "cumulate"
the market shares of all imports from all countries charged with dumping (or
subsidies) on the same product and determine their aggregate impact. In
fact, the ITC is now obligated to apply the cumulation doctrine "if the
"imports compete with each other and with like products of the domestic
industry" in the U.S. market. 22 When applied, "cumulation" helps U.S.
petitioners establish injury and harms foreign respondents with relatively
small market shares. 23 U.S. petitioners have another built-in advantage: a
tie vote on the Commission is treated as an affirmative finding of injury. 24
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(a) (1982). If there is any minimal evidence of injury, the case cannot
be dismissed at this point. Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 6 INT'L TRADE REP.
Dec. (BNA) 2059 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
18. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673d(b) (West Supp. 1985).
19. The relevant criteria for determining which U.S. firms constitute "the industry" are at 19
U.S.C.A. § 1677(4) (West Supp. 1985). 19 U.S.C. § 1677(10) (1982).
20. Under the antidumping (and countervailing duty) laws, the ITC does not weigh compet-
ing causes of injury; if imports are but one contributing cause of injury, that is sufficient. See
Certain Steel Valves and Certain Parts Thereof from Japan, USITC Pub. No. 1556 (July 1984),
6 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 2066. Criteria for determining whether an industry has
suffered injury, from any cause, are at 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(iii) (1982). Section 612 of the
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 established new criteria for determining "threat" of material
injury, which are codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(F) (West Supp. 1985).
21. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(C)(i)-(ii) (1982).
22. Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 § 612, 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7)(C)(iv) (West Supp. 1985).
23. Indeed, the ITC may be compelled to cumulate imports from different sources in most
preliminary determinations. See Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 640 (Ct.
Int'l Trade, 1984) (appeal pending).
24. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(11) (1982).
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B. COUNTERVAILING DUTIES (SUBSIDIES)
The countervailing duty law addresses subsidized imports. It imposes
a penalty duty to offset subsidies conferred by foreign governments. Inter-
national rules on countervailing duties are derived from Article VI of
the GATT as well as the GATT Subsidies Code.2 5 Under U.S. Law2 6 the
Commerce Department determines the percentage of gross sales revenues
that is allocable to a subsidy and uses that percentage as the "subsidy
margin." For example, if a foreign producer was found to have received a
subsidy in a particular year of $2 million to promote exports of its cloth and
if its worldwide cloth sales were $10 million, the Commerce Department
would determine a subsidy margin of twenty percent-and ultimately a
countervailing duty of twenty percent.
For some but not all countries, there is an injury determination as well.
The ITC must find that the subsidized imports have caused some actual or
threatened "material injury" to a competing U.S. industry. Such an "injury
test" applies when the case involves a country (a) which has signed the
GATT Subsidies Code, (b) which has concluded an agreement with the
United States committing itself to obligations similar to those in the GATT
Subsidies Code (as Mexico has recently done), or (c) which is simply a
member of GATT but its imports in question would otherwise enter the
U.S. duty free. 27 If an injury test applies, the standards are identical to those
under the antidumping law. Indeed, the statutory criteria for determining
material injury apply directly to both laws. 28
1. Types of Subsidies
Subsidies are financial benefits conferred on an exported product. There
are two basic groupings: export subsidies and domestic subsidies. With some
exceptions (such as remission of local sales or value-added taxes), all ben-
efits given by a government upon the export of a particular product are
improper "export subsidies" under both U.S. law and the GATF. 29
25. The full name of the GATT Subsidies Code is The Agreement On Interpretation And
Application Of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(Relating To Subsidies And Countervailing Measures), reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 96-153,
Part 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. at 257 (1979). See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2503 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985).
26. The relevant United States statute and regulations are at 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1982), 19
U.S.C.A. § 1671 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985) et seq., and 19 C.F.R. pt. 355 (1984).
27. The first two groups of countries receive an injury test by virtue of the fact that they are
qualifying countries (or "countries under the Agreement") within the meaning of 19 U.S.C.A.
§ 1671 (West 1980 & West. Supp. 1985). The third group of countries receives an injury test by
virtue of 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a)(2) (1982). For all other countries, there is no injury test by virtue
of 19 U.S.C. § 1303(b) (1982). The Mexican agreement referred to is reprinted in 2 INT'L TRADE
REP. (BNA) 590 (1985). It was adopted pursuant to procedures at 15 C.F.R. Part 2009 (1984).
28. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677(7) (West 1980 & Supp. 1985) which applies to both antidumping
and countervailing duty proceedings.
29. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(A) (1982), and GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 24, at art. 9
and Annex.
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"Domestic subsidies" are benefits conferred to promote the production
or sale of products which may or may not be exported. If a product is later
exported, a subsidy question would then arise. A key question is whether
the benefit is "generally available" to all businesses in the country or
whether it is conferred on a particular business or industry. Suppose a
government benefit has been granted to a "specific enterprise or industry" in
the foreign country. In that situation, a "subsidy" will normally be found. 30
By contrast, if a domestic subsidy is generally available to all businesses or
industries in a country, the countervailing duty law does not apply.
2. Treatment of Domestic Subsidies
Countervailing duties have been imposed to offset government grants,
"soft" government loans, government loan guarantees, and certain govern-
ment "equity" contributions to state-owned firms. Here the key issue is
whether a government payment or assist to a specific firm is "consistent with
commercial considerations" that would be applied by a private investor
engaging in the same transaction. 3' Indeed, if a loan, guaranty or payment
to a specific firm is not expected to produce the type of return that a private
investor would expect, the Commerce Department may recognize a
subsidy. 32
In a recent decision involving British Steel, a court affirmed countervail-
ing duties against British government programs to retire excess steel capac-
ity-and thus return British Steel to a profitable footing.33 The decision is
being appealed. The case, however, raises a profound question about the
policies underlying U.S. law: Is a government payment to eliminate the
need for further subsidization, a "subsidy" which Congress intended to
penalize under the countervailing duty law? The Commerce Department
view is that once a state-owned business like British Steel has become
dependent on government subsidies to cover recurring losses, further pay-
ments to restructure the company and return it to financial independence
are countervailable subsidies. The view appears inconsistent with GATI
policy that recognizes the legitimacy of short term restructuring efforts
conducted in a non-injurious manner. 34
If a domestic subsidy is deemed a "grant" from a government, the
Commerce Department has a special way of calculating the subsidy. It treats
30. 19 U.S.C. § 1677(5)(B) (1982).
31. See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 4 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 2021,
2029-30 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1983).
32. See Cold-Rolled Carbon Steel Products From Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 18006, 5 INT'L
TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 2217 (1984).
33. British Steel Corp. v. United States, 6 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 1929 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985).
34. GATT Subsidies Code, supra note 26, at art. 11.
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a government grant almost as an insurance company would a payment to
purchase an annuity. For example, if a $200,000 subsidy is deemed a
"grant," the Commerce Department would not find a single $200,000 sub-
sidy. Instead, it would view the payment as a purchase of $200,000 worth of
income-producing assets, which would have a useful life typical of assets in
that industry (e.g., 10 years). It would then determine the applicable dis-
count or interest rate in the foreign country concerned (e.g., 12 percent).
Finally, the Commerce Department would then calculate the "annuity"
which such a $200,000 payment could purchase over 10 years at the 12
percent discount rate. The result: approximately $35,000 per year for each
of the 10 years. In other words, the Commerce Department assumes that the
$200,000 grant was the equivalent of subsidized assets worth $35,000 per
year for 10 years. 35
The effect on a foreign exporter is substantial. Instead of paying a short-
lived countervailing duty in one year covering a single $200,000 payment,
imports from that producer are hit with smaller countervailing duties over 10
full years. Here, too, there is a serious question of whether the approach is
consistent with GATT policies. The objective of the GATI Subsidies Code
is to eliminate subsidies as quickly as possible. If the foreign government in
our example ceased making $200,000 payments tomorrow, imports from
that country would potentially be penalized with countervailing duties for
another nine years-a policy, arguably, of all stick and no carrot.
3. Communist Imports
A case now pending will decide whether the countervailing duty law
applies to imports from communist nations. The law has never been so
applied before. It has been argued that the term "subsidy" has no meaning
for a non-market economy where all economic decisions are controlled by
the government and where, in a sense, every economic act is a subsidy. Yet,
the statute (which, incidentally, predates the Bolshevik Revolution) applies
on its face to "any" country. 36 A decision making the law applicable to
communist imports could have serious consequences for trade with the
People's Republic of China and Eastern Bloc countries. A lower court has
ruled that the law does apply to non-market economies; that decision is
being appealed.37
35. See Michelin Tire Corp. v. United States, 5 INT'LTRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 1545 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1983), vacated by agreement of parties, 6 Int'l Trade 1847 (1985); Cold-Rolled Carbon
Steel Products From Argentina, 49 Fed. Reg. 18006; 5 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 2217
(1984).
36. See 19 U.S.C. § 1303(a) (1982).
37. Continental Steel Corp. v. United States, 7 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. 1001 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985), appeal pending.
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4. Upstream Subsidies
The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 gave the Commerce Department
authority to impose a countervailing duty on subsidies conferred at "up-
stream" stages of production. (The upstream subsidy must be conferred by
the same country, or customs union like the European Community, in which
the "downstream" production occurs.) For example, suppose a government
benefit is conferred on Korean-made steel; the steel is manufactured into
machinery in Korea; the machinery is then exported to the United States.
The Commerce Department under the new law would have discretion to find
a subsidy on the machinery. The Commerce Department would first have to
find that: (a) the subsidy "bestows a competitive benefit" on the final
product (the machinery), and (b) it has a "significant effect on the cost of
manufacturing" that product.
38
How the Commerce Department intends to apply this new authority
remains to be seen. Assume our Korean machinery maker purchases his
steel at $400 per ton, which is found to benefit from a 10 percent subsidy
(e.g., without a subsidy, the steel would have cost $440). Assume that he
could have also purchased similar steel (imported or domestic) for $420 per
ton. Will the Commerce Department find an upstream subsidy of $40 per
ton or $20 per ton? (The "competitive benefit would appear to be only $20
here.) Or will the Department find a basis not to impute any subsidy at all?
(It would if $20 were deemed not to have a "significant effect" on costs of
manufacture.) In its first preliminary decision under this provision, the
Commerce Department said that an upstream subsidy accounting for more
than one percent of the cost of manufacturing the downstream product had a
"significant effect. '' 38a
C. ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING
DuTY PROCEDURES
Under both the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, the proce-
dures are in many respects identical. An antidumping or countervailing duty
case begins when a U.S. firm (or group of firms), on behalf of a U.S.
industry, files a petition. 39 The Commerce Department may also initiate a
case without a petition, on its own motion.4° Once initiated, a case has five
38. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1677-1 (West Supp. 1985).
38a. Certain Agricultural Tillage Tools From Brazil (Preliminary), 50 Fed. Reg. 24270,
24274 (1985).
39. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671a(b) (West Supp. 1985), 19 U.S.C. § 1671(a)(C) (1982) and 19
C.F.R. §§ 355.26, 355.27 (1984), with respect to countervailing duties; and 19 U.S.C.
§ 1673a(b), (c) (1982) and 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.36, 353.37 (1984), with respect to antidumping
duties.
40. 19 U.S.C. § 1671a(a) (1982), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1673a(a) (West Supp. 1985).
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milestones: (1) a preliminary decision by the ITC that there is some minimal
evidence of injury; (2) a preliminary determination by the Commerce
Department of whether there is dumping or subsidies, and, if there are, the
preliminary dumping or subsidy margin; (3) a final Commerce Department
determination as to dumping or subsidies; (4) if the Commerce Department
has found dumping or subsidies, a final determination by the ITC that the
imports have caused some material injury; and (5) if dumping (or subsidies)
and injury both exist, a final "antidumping order" or "countervailing duty
order" by the Commerce Department. Of course, in a countervailing duty
case, steps (1) and (4) apply only to countries that qualify for an injury test.41
Some of these milestones have an immediate effect on imports. When the
Commerce Department makes a preliminary finding that there has been
dumping or subsidies, it directs the Custom Service to preclude imports
unless a bond or cash deposit is posted to cover the preliminary duty
amount.42 When the Commerce Department issues a final antidumping
order (or countervailing duty order), a bond is not enough; Customs will not
release the goods unless the importer makes a cash deposit covering the
"estimated" dumping or countervailing duties.43 The duties are later final-
ized on an annual basis (called an "annual review"), based on updated price
and cost (or subsidies) information.44
In most circumstances, an antidumping or countervailing duty order must
remain in effect for at least twenty-four months. After that time, one can
apply for a review of the underlying determination on grounds (1) that
imports have occurred for at least two years with no dumping or that the
subsidies have been eliminated, or (2) there are changed circumstances
making the imports no longer injurious. If either is established, the orders
will be revoked as to future imports. 45 Before a final order is issued in the
first place, there is also a possibility of suspending or settling a case.46
The Commerce Department and ITC rely on questionnaires for their
data. The Commerce Department sends its questionnaires only to the
41. See supra note 27.
42. For countervailing duties, see 19 U.S.C. § 1671b(d) (1982) and 19 C.F.R. § 355.28(d)
(1984). For antidumping duties, see 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(d) (1982) and 19 C.F.R. § 353.39(e)
(1984). If the Commerce Department finds no subsidies or dumping at its preliminary deter-
mination, but then finds subsidies or dumping at its final determination, the bonding or cash
deposit requirement is imposed at that time. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671d(c)(1)(B), 1673d(c)(1) (1982).
43. For countervailing duties, see 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671e(a)(3) (West Supp. 1985) and 19
C.F.R. § 355.36(c) (1984). For antidumping duties see 19 U.S.C. § 1673e(a)(3) (1982) and 19
C.F.R. § 353.48(a)(3) (1984).
44. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(a) (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985) and 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.53,355.41
(1984).
45. 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(2) (1982), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1675(C) (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985)
19 C.F.R. §§ 355.41(b) (1984).
46. This is an intricate subject. See Homer & Bello, U.S. Import Law and Policy Series:
Suspension and Settlement Agreements in Unfair Trade Cases, 18 INT'L LAW. 683 (1984).
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foreign parties. There is a penalty if the foreign parties do not respond: the
Commerce Department simply uses the "best information available," which
may be unfavorable information supplied by the U.S. petitioners.47 If the
foreign parties do cooperate, they usually receive confidential protection for
their data if they request it (or they are given the right to withdraw the
data).48 All foreign data is then verified by the Commerce Department
through mini-audits in the foreign country. 49
At the ITC, the questionnaires go to everyone in the U.S. marketplace:
U.S. petitioners, importers, and customers who purchase the product.
Failure to respond to an ITC questionnaire may lead to an ITC subpoena,
although this rarely occurs; or, the ITC may use less favorable data under
the "best information available" doctrine. 5
There are mandatory statutory deadlines under both the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws. Depending on whether any extensions are
granted, an antidumping case will last between nine and fourteen months. 51
It is seven to ten months for a countervailing duty case. 52 The fact that there
will be a definite decision after a fixed period of time is of considerable
benefit to the U.S. petitioners-although many U.S. companies complain
that they must suffer several months of injurious import competition, before
they can show injury and obtain relief.
D. SECTION 337 (INFRINGEMENT, UNFAIR PRACTICES)
Permitted under Article XX of the GATT, the Section 337 remedies of
the Tariff Act of 193053 are directed at other unfair import practices besides
dumping or subsidies. This includes infringement of patents, registered and
common law trademarks, and copyrights; antitrust-type violations; and
other unfair acts or methods of competition (e.g., false advertising, palming
off). In addition to showing an unfair practice involving an import, one must
47. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 353.51(b), 355.39(b) (1984).
48. Confidential data may be released, under strict administrative protective orders, to
lawyers (or sometimes outside consultants) of the U.S. petitioner but not to businessmen. 19
U.S.C.A. § 1677f(b), (c) (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985); 19 C.F.R. § 353.27-353.31,
355.17-355.21 (1984). Those receiving access under an administrative protective order may
include in-house counsel. United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 730 F.2d 1465 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 353.51, 355.39 (1984).
50. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985), 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(b) (1982); 19
C.F.R. § 207.8 (1984).
51. One must aggregate the time periods provided in 19 U.S.C. § 1673b(b)(1), (c)(1) (1982);
19 U.S.C.A. § 1673d(a) (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673d(b)(2), (3) (1982).
52. One must aggregate the time periods in 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671b(b) (West Supp. 1985),
19 U.S.C. § 1671b(c)(1982), 19 U.S.C.A. § 1671d(a) (West Supp. 1985), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1671d(b)(2), (3) (1982).
53. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985) and 19 C.F.R. Pts. 210 and 211
(1984).
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show that the practice has the effect or tendency to cause "substantial
injury" to U.S. firms that both produce the product in the United States and
are "efficiently and economically operated., 54 The main Section 337 pro-
ceeding is before the International Trade Commission. There is, however,
presidential review of any relief granted by the ITC.
The remedies under Section 337 are sweeping. The ITC may order all
imports which are found to benefit from an unfair practice excluded totally
from the United States. 55 Such an exclusion order is enforced continuously
by U.S. Customs, an immense benefit to U.S. firms in infringement cases.
Alternatively, the ITC may issue a cease and desist order, which is backed
by potential penalties of $10,000 for each day the order is violated.56 There
is also the possibility (infrequently granted) of interim relief before a final
decision-namely, exclusion of the imports unless a bond at least equal to
their value is posted.57 No relief, interim or final, will be granted unless the
ITC also finds that the relief would be consistent with the public welfare,
competitive conditions, and consumer interests. 58
1. Procedures
A Section 337 case involves the filing with the ITC of a highly detailed
complaint, 59 a decision by the ITC to accept or reject the complaint, 60 a
mini-trial before an ITC administrative law judge, 61 followed by possible
review of the law judge's ruling by the full Commission. 62 All discovery,
hearings, briefs, decisions and Commission review must be completed
within a twelve-month statutory period-which runs from the date the
complaint is accepted and the proceeding notice is published in the Federal
Register (about four weeks after the complaint is filed). The twelve-month
deadline.may be extended to eighteen months, if the case is found extraordi-
narily complex. 63
The President has sixty days to reject any ITC decision granting relief. If
the President does not act within sixty days, the ITC decision becomes final.
If the President rejects the decision, no relief is granted. The President has
rejected ITC decisions only four times under current law, the latest being in
the "Gray Market" goods case (see infra Pt. I.D.6.).
54. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(a) (1982).
55. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (1982); see 10 C.F.R. § 12.39(b) (1984) concerning Customs
enforcement.
56. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (f) (1982).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (e) (1982); 19 C.F.R. §§ 12.39(b)(2), 113.14(z), and 210.14 (1984).
58. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e) and (f) (1982).
59. 19 C.F.R. § 210.20 (1984).
60. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.11, 210.12 (1984).
61. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.40-210.53 (1984).
62. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.54-210.56 (1984).
63. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1982) and 19 C.F.R. § 210.15 (1984).
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2. Use of Section 337
Because of its relative speed, and the growth of infringing imports, the
Section 337 case-load at the ITC has grown. Several recent cases have ended
in consent orders, under which the alleged infringer agreed either to cease
further production of infringing products or to pay royalties.6 4 This has
meant a solution within five to six months after the case was brought.
From the perspective of a U.S. firm holding a valid patent, trademark or
copyright which is infringed by imports, a Section 337 proceeding has some
obvious advantages over a suit in U.S. District Court. The final ITC deci-
sion, again, must be made within twelve months after the complaint is
accepted (within eighteen months in complicated cases), rather than two to
four years in District Court. A Section 337 case, while cost intensive, is
usually cheaper to litigate than a District Court infringement suit. The end
result can be sweeping: again, a total exclusion of all of offending imports
from the United States, continuously enforced at the border by U.S. Cus-
toms. There is no risk of counterclaims, although the respondent can, and
often does, challenge the validity of the original patent or copyright. And a
single case may cover imports from several sources; several lawsuits in
various District Courts might be required to reach the same scope.
There are also drawbacks to the United States firm. There is always the
risk, albeit remote, that the President will veto any hard-won relief from the
ITC. Also, there is no possibility of a damages award under Section 337.
One may, however, contemporaneously sue the infringing parties in U.S.
District Court for damages (if personal jurisdiction can be obtained).
Perhaps the biggest drawback are the requirements that the U.S. petitioner
show that the offending imports have caused "substantial injury" to a U.S.
industry which is actually engaged in the production of a competing product
in the United States-and that relief would be consistent with the public
welfare, competitive conditions and consumer interests.
3. The Injury Standard
The "substantial injury" requirement was toughened recently in Textron,
Inc. v. U.S. International Trade Commission.65 There, the U.S. Court of
Appeals acknowledged that the injury requirement under Section 337 had
been liberally construed in prior cases, at least where the unfair practice
involved an infringement of a patent, trademark or copyright:
Both this court and the ITC have acknowledged that the quantum of proof of
injury is less in the context of patent, trademark, or copyright infringement,
however, than in other types of unfair trade practices, because the holder of the
64. Settlements and consent orders are provided for in 19 C.F.R. § 210.51(c), (d) (1984); 19
C.F.R. §§ 211.20-211.22 (1984).
65. 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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former type of rights is entitled to exclude competitors entirely from using the
intellectual property covered by those rights.
However, the court then went on to hold:
Even in the context of patent, trademark or copyright infringement, the domestic
industry must normally establish that the infringer holds, or threatens to hold, a
significant share of the domestic market in the covered articles or has made a
significant amount of sales of the articles.
66
In short, the "substantial injury" requirement is not to be glossed over. The
U.S. petitioner has to show some measurable damage to its market in the
United States.
4. Other Procedural Aspects
From the perspective of a foreign respondent, a Section 337 case involves
tremendous time pressure and expense. Unlike the U.S. petitioner who
might take some time to prepare a case, a foreign respondent, if he is to
participate, must submit to extensive discovery practice and complete a trial
within a concentrated seven month period.6 7 If he chooses not to appear, the
foreign exporter or producer faces the risk of an exclusion order without an
opportunity to assert available defenses. However, the U.S. petitioner must
still prove his case.
68
A Section 337 administrative trial has three groups of parties: The U.S.
petitioner, the foreign respondents (if they appear) and agency counsel for
the ITC. The role of the latter is to assert the policies of the ITC staff, and,
presumably, to assure some continuity in decision making. The General
Counsel of the ITC, however, remains out of the trial phase, because he may
advise the Commission itself on its final decision. Once an administrative
law judge issues his "initial decision" (which would include adoption of a
consent order), the ITC has discretion to review the decision, or not,
through a formal hearing process.69 If there is no review, the initial decision




Section 337 has been used increasingly against imports of computer and
high-tech products. In 1984, for example, Apple Computers won a major
decision against personal computer imports from Taiwan and Hong Kong,
66. 753 F.2d at 1029.
67. The administrative trial must be completed within seven months after notice instituting
the investigation is published in the Federal Register, or within twelve months in complicated
cases. 19 C.F.R. § 210.41(e) (1984)
68. The statute requires that there be an independent determination by the ITC "with
respect to each investigation conducted by it." 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c) (West Supp. 1985).
69. 19 C.F.R. §§ 210.54-210.56 (1984).
70. 19 C.F.R. § 210.53(h) (1984).
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based on patent and copyright (software) infringement claims. 7 1 A signi-
ficant aspect of the case involved imports of hardware (ROM-less compu-
ters) to which infringing "operating systems software" was added in the
U.S. after import. The imported product (hardware) certainly did not
infringe any copyright (on software) at the time of the import. Infringing
software was added later. The ITC, however, noted that the importation
would be a "contributory infringement" under U.S. copyright laws. It
extended this principle to section 337, finding that the act of importing the
hardware was itself a contributory infringement of Apple's software copy-
rights, actionable under Section 337.72 Other recent cases involving imports
of advanced (but infringing) high technology products signify the increasing
importance of Section 337 in protecting intellectual property rights. 73
6. Gray Market Goods
With the strong dollar, entrepreneurs overseas have purchased legiti-
mate, trademarked goods, manufactured abroad under U.S. license, and
then imported the goods into the United States. These "gray market"
imports often undercut the U.S. markets of the U.S. trademark holder. In
1984, Duracell Batteries won relief from the ITC to enjoin such gray market
imports of its batteries.7 4 But in January 1985 President Reagan rejected the
relief on grounds that relief would be inconsistent with longstanding Trea-
sury Department interpretation of related trademark law under 15 U.S.C.
Section 1124. 75 Duracell has appealed. The outcome will be of concern to
most companies that license production abroad under U.S. trademarks. 76
E. CUSTOMS FRAUD
The Customs Fraud statute 77 intersects with unfair import practices, when
one aspect of the unfair practice is the making of a false or misleading
71. In re Certain Personal Computers And Components Thereof, USITC Pub. No. 1504, 6
INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 1140 (1984).
72. 6 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. at 1149-52.
73. See, e.g., American Hospital Supply Corp. v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 745 F.2d 1
(Fed. Cir. 1984); In re Certain Limited-Charge Cell Culture Microcarriers, USITC Pub. No.
1486, 5 INT'L TRADE REP. Dec. (BNA) 2302 (1984).
74. In re Certain Alkaline Batteries, USITC Pub. No. 1616,6 INT'LTRADE REP. Dec. (BNA)
1849 (1984).
75. 50 Fed. Reg. 1655 (1985).
76. The viability of a related remedy (19 U.S.C. § 1526 (1982)) was recently put in doubt in
Vivitar v. United States, No. 84-1638 (Fed. Cir. May 6, 1985). Note that under other statutes
(e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982)), recent District Court decisions have denied relief against gray
market imports. Compare Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983), and El Greco Leather
Products Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
77. 19 U.S.C.A. § 1592 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985).
VOL. 19, NO. 3
SYMPOSIUM/U.S. TRADE REMEDIES 779
statement in the customs clearance process. Most customs fraud cases
involve misrepresentations of the true transaction price, the nature of the
goods, the actual producer, or the country of origin. There are substantial
civil and criminal penalties for making false statements to the U.S. Customs
Service. Violations fall into three categories (simple negligence, gross negli-
gence and actual fraud) and the penalties vary accordingly. 78 A proposal is
pending in Congress to strengthen the law by increasing the penalties and
making a five-year statute of limitations run, in all cases, from the date of
discovery of the fraud.
III. Remedies to Adjust Trade Flows
A second grouping of U.S. trade remedies takes a more global focus
toward trade flows between the United States and other countries. Some of
these remedies are directed at unfair practices that curtail U.S. export sales
or that artificially affect trade flows (Section 301) 7 9 Some are directed at
serious influxes of imports to the United States, even if fairly traded (Sec-
tions 20180 and 40681). Some are directed at specialized concerns like na-
tional security.
A. SECTION 301 (RETALIATION To PROTECT U.S. TRADE)
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 197482 is directed at foreign government
practices that restrict offshore markets to U.S. goods and services, or that
artificially divert goods or services to the United States. These practices can
include subsidization, non-tariff barriers to trade, barriers to investment,
and inadequate protection of intellectual property rights. The President has
discretion to retaliate against these foreign practices by retaliating against
imports from the offending country (or by imposing similar restrictions on
that country's right to engage in services in the U.S.). Concern about the
political will to exercise this discretion has made Section 301 an underuti-
lized remedy in the past.
1. International Procedure
The discretionary nature of the remedy must be viewed against a parallel
international process under Section 301. At the same time that the President
and the trade agencies are considering possible retaliation, the dispute must
78. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c) (1982).
79. Trade Act of 1974 § 301, 19 U.S.C. § 241 (1982).
80. Trade Act of 1974 § 201, 19 U.S.C.A. § 2251 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985).
81. Trade Act of 1974 § 406, 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
82. See supra note 79.
SUMMER 1985
780 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
also be raised at the international level.8 3 This always includes consultations
with the offending foreign government. If the foreign country is a GATT
member and if the practice is covered by GATT, formal dispute settlement
before the GATT is also required. GATT Article XXIII establishes a
general obligation to refer trade disputes "to the Contracting Parties" (i.e.,
to the appropriate GAT body) for a recommendation or ruling on how to
resolve the dispute. In practice, an aggrieved country (e.g., the United
States) requests that a panel be established under the GATT to hear the
dispute. The proceedings are usually in Geneva. The panel makes findings
and recommendations to the GATT Council (composed of representatives
of all GATT signatories) or to an appropriate GATF Code Committee
(composed of representatives of signatories of that particular Code). The
GATT Council or Code Committee, if it finds that a breach has been
committed, will direct the offending country to bring its practices into
conformity with its GAT obligations. If the offending country does not
comply, "countermeasures" may be authorized.
Note that these procedures do not apply to matters not covered by
GATT, such as services, or to non-signatories of GAT. Also, under Sec-
tion 301, the President may still impose import restrictions even if "counter-
measures" are not authorized under GATT procedures-as the President
did recently in the "citrus-pasta" case (see infra Pt. II.A.4).
It cannot be overemphasized that, in the view of many trade officials, a
successful Section 301 case depends ultimately on the political and diploma-
tic leverage of the United States to negotiate a solution short of direct
retaliation. Yet, judicious use of retaliation necessarily gives the remedy
greater credibility.
2. U.S. Procedure
Any U.S. firm may petition the United State Trade Representative
(USTR) under Section 301 (1) to enforce existing U.S. rights under trade
agreements or take action against foreign government practices inconsistent
with trade agreements, or (2) to respond to foreign government acts which
are "unjustifiable, unreasonable or discriminatory" and which burden or
restrict U.S. commerce (irrespective of any trade agreement violation).8 4
The petition must present evidence of a foreign government practice (not
private conduct) and suggest a response. Again, the purpose of any "re-
sponse" is not to retaliate against imports as an end in itself, but to eliminate
the unfair trade practice abroad-in other words, to coerce a change before
retaliation becomes necessary.
83. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2413 (a) (West Supp. 1985).
84. 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2411, 2412 (West Supp. 1985). See 15 C.F.R. §§ 2006.0-2006.3 (1984),
for procedures relating to petitions.
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There are statutory timetables to prod the process, once USTR accepts a
petition. USTR and the other trade agencies must make a recommendation
to the President within thirty days after international (GATT) dispute
settlement is completed (if the practice violates a GAT trade agreement);
or within eight months of acceptance of the petition if the trade practice is a
subsidy (seven months if an export subsidy); or within twelve months for any
other type of practice.85 USTR also affords an opportunity for public
comment and hearings.86 After a recommendation is made, the President
must make his decision within twenty-one days. The President's decision has
often been to undertake further negotiations, particularly if there is some
indication of flexibility from the offending country.
3. The 1984 Law
The 1984 Trade Act broadened the President's retaliatory authority in
several ways. Section 301 was made expressly applicable to services. 87 It
would thus apply to a foreign country restricting its markets to U.S. insur-
ance carriers, banks or U.S. commercial services. The President may now
retaliate against such restrictions by imposing penalty fees or limits on
foreign services offered in the United States. 88
The President in 1984 was also given a authority to negotiate reciprocal
tariff reductions for high-tech products, to respond to investment practices
that affect trade, and to secure foreign protection of U.S. intellectual
property rights.89 The use of Section 301 against foreign government prac-
tices that undermine U.S. patents and copyrights is potentially significant.
Conceptually, if a foreign country does not respect U.S. intellectual prop-
erty rights, U.S. trade flows are distorted. U.S. exports embodying those
rights are restricted; trade in infringing products is increased. To date, most
efforts in this area have involved bilateral negotiations with certain less
developed countries that tolerate infringement practices combined with a
threat that these countries would lose duty-free treatment under the Gen-
eral System of Preferences (GSP) if steps to protect U.S. intellectual prop-
erty are not adopted. 90 But the possibility of a Section 301 case should not be
discounted.
85. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(a) (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985); 15 C.F.R. § 2006.12 (1984).
86. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2414(b) (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985); 15 C.F.R. §§ 2006.7-2006.10
(1984).
87. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(e)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1985).
88. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(b)(2) and (c) (West Supp. 1985).
89. 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411(e)(1)(B), and (e)(3), and (e)(4) (West Supp. 1985). The authority to
reduce the duties on high technology products appears at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2138 (West Supp.
1985). The President has already implemented some of these duty reductions. Proclamation
5305 of February 21, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 7571 (1985).
90. Under GSP, certain products from less developed countries may enter the United States
duty free. See 19 U.S.C.A. § 2461 et seq. (West Supp. 1985).
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4. Recent Use of Section 301
Two recent cases typify how Section 301 may be successfully used by U.S.
firms. In late 1983, the U.S. Rice Millers Association brought a Section 301
case alleging that Taiwan subsidized its own rice exports, which in turn
limited U.S. rice exports to third countries. Consultations ensued between
USTR and Taiwan authorities. In March 1984 Taiwan agreed to place
quantitative limits on its own rice exports and the U.S. petitioners, in return,
withdrew their petition. 91 The export limits roughly offset the artificial ben-
efits from the subsidy.
In a 1984 case, a trade association of air courier companies claimed that
Argentina restricted trade in air courier services by requiring all interna-
tional commercial documents from Argentina to be sent through the Argen-
tine postal system. This not only precluded U.S. competition with the
Argentina postal service, but it closed an entire market to U.S. air courier
services. In November 1984, the President determined that the Argentine
practices were an unreasonable restriction on U.S. commerce under Section
301. He directed USTR to hold one final round of consultations and then to
submit final proposals for retaliation within thirty days. 92 In December
1984, Argentina suspended its regulation for ninety days and then revoked
the regulation in its entirety.
A third decision, involving citrus exports and pasta, illustrates the impor-
tance of the political climate in which a Section 301 case is brought. 92a
B. SECTION 201 (TEMPORARY IMPORT RELIEF:
THE "ESCAPE CLAUSE")
Section 201 of the Trade Act of 197493 allows U.S. industries "seriously
injured" by imports to obtain temporary relief against all imports of a
particular product from all countries. The remedy is authorized under
GATT Article XIX (sometimes known as the "escape clause" because it
permits countries to "escape" temporarily from their trade concessions to
other nations). Relief may be in the form of quotas, supplementary duties or
tariff-rate quotas (supplemental duties that kick in after a certain quota level
is exceeded). Another possibility is orderly marketing agreements or OMAs
(negotiated export limits agreed to by other countries, rather than import
quotas imposed by the United States). Quotas and duties must be nondis-
91. 49 Fed. Reg. 10761 (1984).
92. See 49 Fed. Reg. 45733 (1984).
92a. 50 Fed. Reg. 25685 (1985); see also, 2 INT'L TRADE REP. Current Reports (BNA) 835
(1985).
93. See 19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2251-2253 (West 1980 & West Supp. 1985) and 19 C.F.R. Part 206
(1984).
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criminatory in their application to different countries, and relief may not be
initially granted for more than five years.94 The idea of Section 201 is to buy
enough time for the U.S. industry to "adjust" to new global competition
that caused the increasing imports.
A Section 201 case is conducted in two phases. First, the petition is filed
with the International Trade Commission, which, during a six month inves-
tigation, determines whether the U.S. industry has suffered or is threatened
with (a) serious injury (b) substantially caused by (c) increasing imports. 95
This is a more demanding injury standard than under the antidumping,
countervailing duty or Section 337 laws, and the ITC has interpreted it
strictly. If the injury test is met, the ITC recommends to the President types
of relief to cure the injury and to permit the U.S. industry to "adjust."
The second phase of a Section 201 case is before the President, who has
total political discretion to grant or withhold relief. The President has sixty
days to make his decision.
96
1. Factors Affecting ITC Decisions
As indicated, the ITC must decide whether a U.S. industry has suffered,
or is threatened with, "serious injury" that has been "substantially caused"
by "increasing imports." The "substantially caused" requirement is the
greatest hurdle. By statute, it must be shown that there is no other cause
besides imports that have contributed more to the injury suffered. 9 7 "Other
causes" may include a non-cyclical change in demand for the product, an
increase in the U.S. cost structure, or a depletion of U.S. raw materials. A
recessionary downturn is no longer treated as a separate cause. 98 Not only
must increasing imports be the chief cause of injury, but the injury itself
must be severe and of some permanence. If these requirements are met, the
ITC then recommends a form of relief to the President.
2. Factors Affecting Presidential Decisions
The President has absolute discretion to grant or withold quotas, duties or
other relief. In making his decision, the President, supported by USTR and
other trade agencies, is obligated to consider the impact on consumers and
whether the U.S. industry is likely to make meaningful adjustments if relief
is granted. 99 He also considers political and diplomatic factors, which have a
94. The types of relief are set forth at 19 U.S.C. § 2253(a) (1982), which also provides that
relief may not exceed an initial five year period. However, the initial period may be extended
once for an additional three years. 19 U.S.C. § 2253(h)(3) (1982).
95. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(1), (d)(2) (1982).
96. 19 U.S.C. § 2252(b) (1982).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 2251(b)(4) (1982).
98. See Unwrought Copper, USITC Pub. No. 1549 (July 1984).
99. These are two of the nine considerations that the President is obligated to consider. 19
U.S.C. § 2252(c) (1982).
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legal aspect. Under Article XIX(3) of GATT, if relief is ganted, other
countries may seek compensating tariff benefits from the U.S. on other
products or, failing an agreement on such compensation, retaliate against
U.S. goods. For example, if the President were to impose relief to benefit
the footwear industry (through quotas or higher tariffs), those GATT
members exporting footwear to the United States may demand compensa-
tory tariff reduction on other products. This, in turn, could affect other U.S.
industries. If an agreement on compensatory tariff reduction was not
reached, foreign governments might retaliate against U.S. exports to their
countries (such as agricultural exports). This, too, generates pressure on the
President from other U.S. interest groups (like the farm lobby).
Responding to these pressures requires not only a strong legal case but
also a strong political one. The very bringing of a section 201 case involves
the marshalling of political allies (especially in Congress) and often good
timing. A petitioner must ask whether there is strong political support for
the U.S. industry involved; what will be the impact on other industries and
on U.S. trading partners; and, on timing, whether the U.S. has recently
taken other protectionist measures which would argue against trade re-
straints in yet another area.
In short, the relief is sweeping, but the road to achieving it is difficult. Of
five groups of companies that brought cases in 1984, only one (the steel
industry) ultimately won some relief. 100 Three industries lost at the ITC
level in 1984 (footwear, tuna and stainless flatware). 101 A fourth (the copper
industry) lost at the Presidential level. 10 2 This is typical of the results since
enactment of the 1974 law: only about 20 percent of all petitions have been
ostensibly successful.
There may, however, be indirect benefits from an unsuccessful section
201 case. The very bringing of a case can mobilize political support for an
endangered industry. This may, in turn, lead to protective legislation or to a
second "bite at the apple." An example is the footwear industry. In 1976,
that industry brought its first section 201 case and won "adjustment assis-
tance" (payments for the government to help an industry adjust, which is
also a potential remedy under Section 201).1 °3 Not sufficiently protected,
the footwear industry brought a second case and in 1977 the President
granted relief in the form of orderly marketing agreements.104 After that
100. Presidential Memorandum of September 18, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 36813 (1984).
101. Nonrubber Footwear, USITC Pub. No. 1545, 49 Fed. Reg. 29161 (1984); Certain
Canned Tuna Fish, USITC Pub. No. 1558, 49 Fed. Reg. 34310 (1984); Stainless Steel Table
Flatware, USITC Pub. No. 1536, 49 Fed. Reg. 24459 (1984).
102. Presidential Memorandum of September 6, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 35609 (1984).
103. USITC Pub. No. 758 (February 1976).
104. See USITC Pub. No. 799 (February 1977); Proclamation 4510 of June 22, 1977, 42 Fed.
Reg. 32430 (1977).
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relief expired, the industry brought a third case, in 1984, and lost before the
ITC on grounds that it had not suffered "serious injury. ' 10 5 Congressional
reaction was negative. In response, Congress adopted somewhat liberalized
standards for determining "serious injury" 10 6 and requested the ITC to
initiate a fourth Section 201 proceeding. The ITC did so and in May 1985
found that, in the intervening year, serious injury had now occurred. 10 6a
C. SECTION 406 (MARKET DISRUPnON BY COMMUNIST IMPORTS)
Section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974107 is directed at "market disruption"
caused by imports from communist nations. The premise of the law is that
socialist countries may focus resources on specific exports, directing those
exports to the United States, which could result in a sudden flooding of U.S.
markets.
Procedurally, Section 406 was modeled after Section 201. The petition is
filed with the ITC, which conducts an "injury" investigation and recom-
mends relief. The President has total discretion on whether actually to grant
relief. As under Section 201, relief may be in the form of higher tariffs,
quotas, tariff rate quotas, or orderly marketing agreements.108
There are some procedural differences, however. A Section 406 case is
brought against imports of a specific communist country, not against all
countries. The ITC investigatory phase lasts three months, instead of six
months as under Section 201.109 Also, the President has the authority to
impose provisional import relief at the outset of a proceeding-a provisional
remedy he has invoked once. 110
The ITC must determine "market disruption," which requires that im-
ports be "increasing rapidly" so as to constitute a "significant cause of
material injury" to a competing U.S. industry.1" The "increasing rapidly"
test has been strictly construed, in light of the underlying purpose of the
statute: to prohibit a flooding of U.S. markets.
Overall, final relief has proved elusive. In fact, of the eleven cases brought
under Section 406, none have resulted in the final imposition of relief. Eight
105. USITC Pub. No. 1545 (July 1984), 49 Fed. Reg. (1984).
106. The new criteria are codified at 19 U.S.C.A. § 2251(b)(2)(D) and (b)(7) (West 1980 &
West Supp. 1985).
106a. Non-Rubber Footware, USITC Pub. No. 1717 (July 1985).
107. 19 U.S.C. § 2436 (1982).
108. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(b) (1982).
109. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(a)(4) (1982).
110. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(c) (1982). The provisional remedy was invoked by President Carter
against Soviet ammonia imports, immediately following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Proclamation 4714, 45 Fed. Reg. 3875 (1980). The ITC later found that the Soviet imports had
not caused market disruption, and the provisional remedies terminated. Anhydrous Ammonia
from USSR, USITC Pub. No. 1051 (April 1980).
111. 19 U.S.C. § 2436(e)(2) (1982)
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cases have been lost before the ITC; the President rejected relief in the
remaining three.
D. NATIONAL SECURITY REMEDY
Recognized under GATT XXI if applied in limited circumstances, section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962112 gives the President discretion to
restrict imports which threaten the national security-e.g., by making the
U.S. overly dependent on those imports during a crisis. The key issues are
whether a strategically important industry is losing capacity because of
imports, and whether sufficient supplies will be available in a crisis (from
domestic or import sources). The remedy is administered by the Secretary of
Commerce who makes a recommendation to the President. It is a rarely
invoked remedy, but should be kept in mind for strategically critical tech-
nologies. Its most prominent use was a 1959 proclamation restricting pe-
troleum imports into the United States. 113 More recently, relief has been
rejected for fasteners and ferroalloys. 114 A case is still pending on machine
tools.
E. INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
Under Section 48(a)(7)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code, the President
has the discretion to make any foreign produced articles ineligible for the
investment tax credit if the foreign country "maintains non-tariff trade
restrictions" which burden U.S. Commerce. This provision has been in-
voked only once, and unsuccessfully, by the United States machine tool
industry against Japanese machine tools that had benefited from industrial
targeting. 15
F. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SURCHARGE
The President has authority to impose a "surcharge" duty of up to 15
percent on all imports into the United States for a period of 150 days. The
President can use this authority if he finds that the country is running a
"serious" balance of payments deficit. 116 Temporary balance of payment
measures are permitted under GATT Article XII, if they do not discrimi-
nate against particular countries.
112. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982).
113. Proclamation 3279 of March 10, 1959, 24 Fed. Reg. 1781 (1959). See also annotation to
19 U.S.C.A. § 1862 (West Supp. 1985).
114. 48 Fed. Reg. 8842 (1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 21391 (1984).
115. The President decided not to grant relief in April, 1983.
116. 19 U.S.C. § 2132 (1982).
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The issue has had some prominence because of the current adverse U.S.
balance of trade. The Reagan Administration, however, has steadfastly
refused to support any such "surcharge." The concern is that other nations
would retaliate against such a step by the United States, and that the overall
impact on trade and the economy would be far worse than the current trade
imbalance. A surcharge against particular countries like Japan, as some
have proposed, would violate the "nondiscrimination" prerequisite under
GATT. If the complaint is more "closed markets" than an adverse "balance
of payments," there is a potentially effective alternative under Section 301
(see supra Pt. II.A).
IV. Political and Product Specific Remedies
A third grouping of remedies are those which are product or sector
specific. Their purpose is usually to protect a specific domestic industry or to
open a foreign market to a specific U.S. export. Many such remedies are
highly controversial, while others have provided innovative solutions to
difficult political issues.
A. AGRICULTURE, TEXTILES, AD Hoc LEGISLATION
Laws restricting agricultural and textile imports are among the most
controversial in the U.S. trade arsenal. Section 22 of the Agricultural
Adjustment Act 1 7 provides for discretionary restrictions against imports
which interfere with U.S. domestic farm programs. If the Secretary of
Agriculture believes that imports "materially interfere with" any U.S.
agriculture program or "reduce substantially" products processed from
commodities covered by a U.S. agriculture program, he may ask the Presi-
dent to direct the International Trade Commission to determine if imports
have had these effects. " 8 The ITC conducts an investigation and hearing. It
reports its findings and recommendations to the President. If the President
agrees, he imposes quotas or import fees. 19 Under section 22, significant
quotas or fees have been imposed against imports of dairy products, raw
cotton and sugar. 120 In a controversial move, President Reagan recently
extended the sugar quotas to a range of products that happen to contain
sugar. 121
117. 7 U.S.C. § 624 (1982).
118. 7 U.S.C. § 624(a) (1982).
119. 7 U.S.C. § 624(b) (1982).
120. For dairy products, see Proclamation 4708 of December 11, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 72069
(1979). For sugar and related products, see Proclamation 4940 of May 5, 1982, 47 Fed. Reg.
19657 (1982).
121. Proclamation 5294 of January 28, 1985, 50 Fed. Reg. 4187 (1982). The theory was that
some of these other products were being converted back to sugar, to avoid the quotas.
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Section 204 of the Agriculture Act of 1956122 gives the President further
authority to conclude agreements with foreign countries restricting agri-
cultural and textile imports, and also to impose direct quotas. The President
has used this authority to conclude textile agreements under the Multifiber
Arrangement (MFA) and, under MFA standards, to impose quotas on
selective textile products.1 23 The MFA itself expires in June, 1986, and
major changes in global textile trade restrictions are likely to ensue. 124
The United States also has some ad hoc-and avowedly protectionist-
legislation to benefit specific industries. Mandatory quotas have been estab-
lished for meat imports, watches and watch movements, among others.
125
All of these product specific remedies lead to an unavoidable admission: like
other nations, the United States has skeletons in its "free trade" closet.
More defensible internationally is a new "Bonus Incentive Commodity
Export Program" or "BICEP.''125a
B. REMEDIES ROOTED IN FOREIGN POLICY
Most foreign policy restrictions on trade with other countries are not
strictly "trade remedies" within the scope of this article. Their purpose is to
deal with foreign policy issues, not a trade problem. Among these are
restrictions on trade with Cuba, North Korea, Cambodia, and North and
South Vietnam. 126
122. 7 U.S.C. § 1854 (1982).
123. See Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25 U.S.T.
1001, T.I.A.S. No. 7840 and Protocol Extending International Textile Trade Agreement, done
on Dec. 22, 1981, T.I.A.S. No. 10323. An important step in the administration of U.S. textile
quotas has been the recently promulgated regulations on determining the "country of origin" of
textile products. The new rules are designed to limit evasion of textile quotas applicable to
individual countries-foreign producers have evaded quotas by shifting aspects of textile
production to countries with excess quota or no quota limits at all. See 50 Fed. Reg. 8710 and
9796 (1985).
124. The MFA is not the sole international agreement on a specific commodities. There are
international conventions that regulate trade in coffee, rubber, sugar and wheat. International
Coffee Agreement, 1983, reprinted in Senate Treaty Doc. No. 98-2, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983); International Natural Rubber Agreement, 1979, T.I.A.S. No. 10379; International
Sugar Agreement, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 5135, T.I.A.S. No. 9664; Wheat Trade Convention, 1971,
22 U.S.T. 820, T.I.A.S. No. 7144, extended by Protocol of April 4, 1983, reprinted in Senate
Treaty Doc. No. 98-5, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (statistical monitoring only).
125. Meat Import Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-177, 93 Stat. 1291 (current version in U.S.
INT'L TRADE COMM'N, TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES ANNOTATED (1985)); for watches
and watch movements, see Omnibus Tariff Act of Jan. 12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-446, § 110, 96
Stat. 2329, 2331-2333 (current version in U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, TARIFF SCHEDULE OF THE
UNITED STATES ANNOTATED (1985)). There have also been serious efforts in Congress to impose
mandatory quotas on textile imports, to replace the MFA system. See H.R. 1562, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1985).
125a. See 50 Fed. Reg. 23750 (1985).
126. Trade with Cuba is generally precluded under 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (1984). Trade with the
remaining countries is generally prohibited under 31 C.F.R. Part 500 (1984).
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Some foreign policy rooted measures, however, are directed at trade
problems. One example is a prohibition on imports produced by slave or
convict labor. 127 While originally directed against the Soviet Union, there is
a trade purpose to the law: goods benefiting from convict labor are inher-
ently subsidized and unfairly traded.
U.S. foreign policy also concerns itself with international fishery and
resource conservation. To help enforce these foreign policy objectives,
there are accompanying trade restrictions on certain fish and wildlife prod-
ucts. Under one of these, United States may prohibit the importation of all
fish or wildlife products from a country which violates internationally agreed
conservation measures. 128 A recent court decision has found that Japan has
exceeded whaling quotas established under the International Whaling
Convention. 129 As a result, the court directed the Secretary of Commerce to
certify Japan in violation of U.S. fisheries conservation programs, which
could result in a prohibition of Japanese imports of fish products under 22
U.S.C.A. § 1978(a) 130 as well as a restriction on Japanese rights to fish
in U.S. waters under 16 U.S.C.A. § 1821(e). 13 The United States has ap-
pealed the decision. 132
C. BILATERAL REMEDIES: JAPAN
The United States conducts a broad program of bilateral negotiations
with several nations with which it has trade problems. The most prominent
series of negotiations has been with Japan. A continuing U.S. complaint
against Japan has been the use of quotas, high tariffs and non-tariff barriers
to restrict access for U.S. goods to Japanese markets. Key areas of dispute
have involved agricultural products (beef, citrus, fruits, tobacco), lumber
products, electronics, semiconductors, aluminum, pharmaceuticals, and
telecommunications equipment.
The principal vehicle for dealing with these disputes has been a series of
face to face negotiations, backed by political pressures from the United
States (including threats of congressional retaliation) and matched on the
Japanese side by similar political pressure from interest groups in Japan.
Such negotiations have resulted in selective market liberalization measures.
They are outside the realm of formal, legal remedies. Results, if any, are ad
hoc compromises to difficult political problems.
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1982).
128. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982).
129. American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985), appeal
pending.
130. West 1980 & West Supp. 1985.
131. West Supp. 1985.
132. A related statute prohibits fish imports from countries that seize U.S. fishing vessels. 16
U.S.C.A. § 1825(a)(4), (b) (West Supp. 1985).
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D. VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT ARRANGEMENTS
Voluntary Restraint Arrangements, or VRAs, are a type of negotiated
remedy. They involve undertakings by a foreign country or countries to
restrict, to agreed levels, their exports of certain products to the United
States (such as Japan did in 1982 on its automobile exports). The legal basis
for VRAs has provoked some controversy. The President in the past has
used his constitutional authority to promote VRAs. However, where the
VRA involves something more than a unilateral undertaking by a foreign
country-and includes some commitment or undertaking on behalf of the
United States-constitutional authority of the President may not suffice.
Indeed the decision in Consumers Union v. Kissinger133 indicates that U.S.
action under a VRA must be based on, and consistent with, statutory
authority delegated by Congress.
VRAs have been most frequently used in regulating trade in steel. In-
deed, Consumers Union v. Kissinger involved a 1968 VRA under which the
State Department secured commitments from various foreign steel produc-
ers and their governments to limit exports of steel to the United States. Such
undertakings by individual producers, without some compulsion from their
governments, is fraught with antitrust implications.' 34
In 1984, the President began negotiating a new series of VRAs on steel,
armed with congressional authority.' 35 These VRAs arose out of a Section
201 case on carbon steel. The President, while denying formal relief under
Section 201, committed himself to negotiate a series of VRAs with the
leading steel suppliers to the United States, in an effort to limit total carbon
steel imports into the United States to 18.5 percent of the U.S. market. 136
By opting for such "voluntary" agreements, the President was able to avoid
many of the political and international repercussions of unilaterally imposed
remedies under section 201.
VRAs have served as compromises to difficult political controversies. In
the Japanese auto case, Japan was confronted with the prospect of severe
quota legislation pending in Congress. On steel, foreign steel producers
were confronted with potentially exclusionary antidumping and counter-
vailing duties if they did not agree to limit their exports. VRAs have been
133. 506 F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
134. An antitrust claim in Consumers Union v. Kissinger was dismissed by stipulation. 506
F.2d at 139. Generally, antitrust risks are minimized if foreign firms are acting pursuant to some
compulsion of their own governments. Indeed, the Attorney General opined that the VRA on
Japanese autos avoided antitrust liability for this reason. See DeKieffer, Antitrust and the
Japanese Auto Quotas, 50 ANTITRUST L.J. 779, 788 (1982).
135. The authority was governed by Section 805 of the Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 (see
Supra note 21). An earlier VRA governing steel exports from the European Community is
authorized by 19 U.S.C. § 1626 (1982).
136. Presidential Memorandum of September 18, 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 36813 (1984).
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criticized for having resulted in increased consumer costs, but they continue
to provide diplomatic flexibility in serious trade disputes.
V. Conclusion
Certainly, U.S. trade remedies are complex and varied. If there is any
unifying theme, it is that the United States is generally committed to the
achievement of a "level playing field" in international trade-a set of
trading rules and practices that permit trade to be carried out free of artificial
stimulants or barriers. But like all countries, the United States has interest
groups that have been successful in obtaining product specific protection.
And like any nation that assumes a leadership role, the United States, to
further trade principles, has at several points been shortchanged in trade
practice. For those shortchanged, the remedies discussed here may help
adjust the balance. For those who depend on imports, these complex
remedies present a formidable set of potential hazards.
SUMMER 1985

